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78 proceeding, the court has authority to remand and order an
agency to conduct a proper hearing if the record before it
"demonstrates a[n] [arbitrary or capricious] lack of appropriate
procedure" by the defendant agency. 386
Citing Liotta v. Rent Guidelines Board387 the court noted that:
Plaintiffs cannot manufacture a [section] 1983 claim by pointing
to the allegedly defective meeting while ignoring that part of the
regulatory process that serves to redress administrative error.
Rather, in considering whether defendants have failed to afford
plaintiffs due process . . . the Court evaluates the entire
procedure, including the adequacy and availability of remedies
under state law. 388
In conclusion, the federal and New York State courts uniformly
hold that the availability of article 78 proceedings sufficiently
protect the property interests of individuals claiming pension plan
survivor's benefits, satisfying procedural due process
requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, and article I, section 6 of the New York State
Constitution. Following the above reasoning, the court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
New Amber Auto Service v. New York City Environmental
Control Board389
(decided November 9, 1994)
Plaintiffs, New Amber Auto Service and Spin Holdings Inc.,
claimed that both an administrative code provision390 and an
environmental control regulation, 391 which they were charged
386. Id.
387. 547 F. Supp. 800, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Liotta, tenants sued the
defendant city's rent guidelines board to enjoin a rent increase that had been
decided during a meeting, described as so "unruly" as to deprive them of
property without due process. The court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment holding that the availability of Article 78 proceedings was
an appropriate remedy, which plaintiffs had failed to utilize timely. Id. at 803-
04.
388. Campo II, 843 F.2d at 102.
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with violating, were unconstitutionally vague. 3 92 In addition,
plaintiffs challenged the environmental control regulation as
violative of their due process rights under the Federal393
Constitution.3 94 The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments and
found both the administrative code provision, section 24-141, and
the environmental control regulation, section 31-53(a), to be
constitutibnal. 395 Likewise, plaintiffs' due process claim was also
dismissed.3 96
New Amber, a Queens auto body shop, was charged with
violating section 24-141 of the City's Administrative Code, when
an inspector from the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection [hereinafter DEP] witnessed a New
Amber employee spray painting a car and emitting paint fumes
into the air.3 97 The DEP inspector issued a notice of violation
and hearing to New Amber for emission of an "odorous air
contaminant" pursuant to section 24-141.398 Similarly, Spin
Holdings, owner and operator of a cafe in Battery Park City, was
issued a notice of violation and hearing by a DEP inspector. 399
389. 619 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1994).
390. NEW YORK Criy, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE & CHARTER § 24-141 (1994).
The code provision provides in pertinent part: "No person shall cause or
permit the emission of air contaminant, including odorous air contaminant, or
water vapor if the air contaminant or water vapor causes or may cause
detriment to the health, safety, welfare or comfort of any person .... " Id.
391. N.Y. COMP. CoDEs R. & REGs. tit. 15, § 31-53(a) (1991). The
regulation provides in pertinent part: "The complainant shall have the burden
of proof in establishing that the respondent has committed or caused the
violation charged in the notice of violation.... " Id.
392. New Amber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 498-99.
393. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The section provides in pertinent part:
"No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law... ." Id.
394. NewAmber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
395. Id. at 500-01.
396. Id. at 500.
397. Id. at 498.
398. Id. A hearing regarding the violation was held by the New York City
Environmental Control Board, where the residing Administrative Law Judge
found against New Amber. Id. After a subsequent appeal was denied, New
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Spin Holding's violation of section 24-141 arose as a result of its
emission of noxious cooking odors and fumes into the open
air.40 0
Plaintiffs challenged the administrative code provision, section
24-141, as both unconstitutionally vague on its face and as
applied. 401 In support of their claim, plaintiffs contended that the
statute was facially vague because "[t]here [was] no definition of
what constitutes a 'detriment to the health, safety, welfare, or
comfort of any person."402 Further, plaintiffs argued that tie
statute provided no objective standard to use in order to
determine whether a particular activity complied with, or
violated, the law. 403  Likewise, plaintiffs challenged the
environmental control regulation, section 31-53(a), as
unconstitutionally vague on the ground that, although the
regulation provided that the complainant had the burden of proof
at the environmental control board hearing, it failed to provide
the particular standard of proof required. 4 04
As an initial matter, the court explained that a party challenging
a legislative enactment must overcome the heavy burden that the
enactment is presumptively valid.405 The court also pointed out
400. Id. The Administrative Law Judge, residing for the New York City
Environmental Control Board, found Spin Holdings' activities to be a violation
of the cited air pollution code provision. Id. An appeal was pending at the time
of the instant action. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. (citing NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE & CHARTER § 24-
141 (1994)).
403. Id. at 498-99. Plaintiffs cite, as an example of this vagueness, the fact
that "a reasonable person may not be bothered by the spray painting, where a
sensitive person might." The argument is that such vagueness leads to arbitrary"
and discriminatory application. Id. at 499.
404. Id. at 501. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, a judge is free to choose
whether to apply a preponderance, clear and convincing, or beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof. Id.
405. See People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 526
N.Y.S.2d 66 (1988) (holding N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35, prohibiting loitering
in Pennsylvania Station and the Port Authority Bus Terminal, to be
unconstitutionally vague because legislative guidelines providing a standard for
determining the type of activity that constituted suspicious loitering in places
of publicly unrestricted access were absent).
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the necessity of drafting legislative enactments in general terms,
capable of "flexible and reasonable application."' 406 In addition,
similar legislative enactments prohibiting emission of air
pollution, which do not provide a precise definition of what
constitutes prohibited emissions, have been found
constitutional. 4 07
A legislativ& enactment, such as a statute or regulation, may be
challenged as unconstitutionally vague in two ways. An
enactment will be found to be facially vague to the extent it
"specifies no comprehensible standard or guide capable of
interpretation" 4 08 or "when it cannot validly be applied to any
conduct.' 409 In addition to facial vagueness, an enactment can be
unconstitutionally vague as applied. 410 The United States
Supreme Court has fashioned a two-part test to determine
whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied.4 11 First,
406. Id. at 499. The court cites Nicholas v. Kahm, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 31, 389
N.E.2d 1086, 1090, 416 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1979):
[I]t is not necessary that the Legislature supply administrative officials
with rigid formulas in fields where flexibility in the adaptation of the
legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the very
essence of the programs. Rather, the standards prescribed by the
Legislature are to be read in light of the conditions in which they are to
be applied.
New Amber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
407. See, e.g., Liberty Lines Express, Inc. v. New York City Envtl.
Control Bd., 160 A.D.2d 295, 296, 553 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (1st Dep't 1990)
(upholding the constitutionality of pollution control codes challenged by a bus
company charged with violating such codes by emitting visible air
contaminants from their buses into the air).
408. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding a city
ordinance that restricted the right to public assembly to be unconstitutionally
vague on its face).
409. Brache v. County of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982) (holding a county drug paraphernalia
ordinance prohibiting the sale of items used exclusively for drug use not to be
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied).
410. NewAmber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
411. Grayned v. City of Rockfbrd, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding a city
anti-noise ordinance prohibiting a person while on the grounds adjacent to an
in-session school building from willfully maling a noise or diversion that
disturbs the peace or good order not to be unconstitutionally vague or
8571995]
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the court must determine whether the statute gives "the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited." ' 412 Then, the court must consider whether the law
provides "explicit standards for those who apply [it] .... "413
In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals has held that "'due
process requires only a reasonable degree of certainty so that
individuals of ordinary intelligence are not forced to guess at the
meaning of the statutory terms." 414
Thus, in applying the New York vagueness standard to the
instant case, the court found both legislative enactments to be
constitutionally sound. 415 With respect to section 24-141, all
parties stipulated to the fact that the statute had to be read in the
context of the entire air pollution regulatory scheme. 416
Therefore, when read as part of the statutory scheme, the statute
possessed a "core meaning that [could] reasonably be
understood."' 417 In applying the United States Supreme Court's
two-part vagueness test, the court concluded that "the person of
overbroad). See United States v. Schneiderman, 968 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act to be neither
unconstitutional on its face nor as applied).
412. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
413. Id.
414. Kew Gardens Assocs. v. Tyburski, 70 N.Y.2d 325, 336, 514 N.E.2d
1114, 1120, 520 N.Y.S.2d 544, 550 (1987) (quoting Foss v. City of
Rochester, 65 N.Y.2d 247, 480 N.E.2d 717, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985)
(holding a New York City statute requiring owners of income-producing
property to furnish income and expense statements to the Commissioner of
Finance in preparation for real property assessment, to be constitutional on its
face). But see Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981)
("[T]he fact that different minds may reach different results when seeking to
determine whether a given [situation] falls within the statutory
definition.., does not render the statute void for vagueness.").
415. NewAmber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01.
416. Id.at 500.
417. Id. (quoting Brache v. County of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47, 51 (2d
Cir. 1981)). Further, the court explained, such terms in section 24-141 as "air
contaminant" and "odorous air contaminant," the emission of which causes
detriment to the health, safety, welfare or comfort of any person, are defined
in administrative code provision, section 24-104. Id.; New Amber, 619
N.Y.S.2d at 500. Also, the term "detriment" is readily understood by its
dictionary meaning of "something that causes damage, harm or loss." Id.
858' [Vol 11
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ordinary intelligence [was] not left to make arbitrary guesses as
to the meaning of the commonly understood and well-defined
terms" found in the statute.418 This finding would also obviously
satisfy the similar standard proffered by the New York Court of
Appeals. 419 As for explicit standards of application, section 24-
141 set forth a list of examples of sources of prohibited odorous
air contaminants, including paint, aircraft and diesel engines,
compost heaps, and fish processing. 420
As for section 31-53(a), the court held, as it has in the vast
majority of civil proceedings, that the "general principle of
administrative law," requiring proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, is the proper standard in administrative hearings. 421
The court recognized that a limited number of civil cases required
a clear and convincing standard of proof,422 as the proof beyond
a reasonable doubt standard was indisputably reserved for
criminal trials. 423 Thus, based on these settled standards and the
fact that plaintiffs would have been advised of the applicable
418. New Amber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 500. The court also finds section 24-141
to be rationally related to the legitimate legislative goal of protecting the ,,ell-
being of human, plant and animal life. Id.
419. Kew Gardens Assocs., 70 N.Y.2d at 336, 514 N.E.2d at 1120, 520
N.Y.S.2d at 550.
420. New Amber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 500. Thus, despite some degree of
latitude on the part of the administrative judge, the statute does provide
sufficient notice as to what types of emissions are proscribed. Id.
421. Id. at 501. Se4 e.g., Property Clerk of N.Y.C. Police Dep't v. Ferris,
77 N.Y.2d 428, 570 N.E.2d 225, 568 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1991); Property Clerk
of N.Y.C. Police Dep't v. McDermott, 185 A.D.2d 134, 585 N.Y.S.2d 746
(Ist Dep't 1992); Silversteinv. Appeals Bd. of the Parking Violations Bureau,
100 A.D.2d 778, 474 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1st Dep't 1984).
422. See Savastano v. Nurnberg, 152 A.D.2d 290, 548 N.Y.S.2d. 555 (2d
Dep't 1989), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 300, 569 N.E.2d 421, 567 N.Y.S.2d 618
(1990) (Mental Hygiene Law); see also Ortenberg v. Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 191 A.D.2d 898, 595 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't 1993) (Department
of Motor Vehicles); Williams v. Perales, 156 A.D.2d 697, 549 N.Y.S.2d 167
(2d Dep't 1989) (Food Stamp Program); Flanagan v. New York State Tax
Comm'n, 154 A.D.2d 758, 546 N.Y.S.2d 205 (3d Dep't 1989) (Tax Law);
Margrander v. Fox, 272 A.D. 788, 70 N.Y.S.2d 207 (4th Dep't 1947)
(fraud).
423. Kurz v. Doerr, 180 N.Y. 88, 72 N.E. 926 (1904).
1.9951 859
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standard at the administrative hearing had they inquired, the court
refused to find section 31-53(a) unpermissibly vague.424
Finally, the court addressed plaintiffs' due process challenge to
section 31-53(a). The court stated that due process protection
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment provides a party in an
administrative proceeding "the opportunity to be heard with
timely and adequate notice advising as to the reasons for the
[proceeding], the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to
call witnesses on its behalf, and the opportunity to present
arguments and evidence."425 Due to the fact that plaintiffs did
not claim they failed to receive notice of the proceeding, or were
deprived of an opportunity to present their case and challenge the
DEP's case, the court found no basis to support a due process
challenge. 426
People v. C.M. 427
(decided April 29, 1994)
In People v. C.M.,428 the Supreme Court, New York County
addressed what it found to be an issue of first impression in New
York;429  whether a defendant may waive his federal
constitutional430 or state statutory431 right to a public trial,
424. New Amber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
425. Id. at 500 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970)).
426. NewAmber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
427. 161 Misc. 2d 574, 614 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1994).
428. Id.
429. Id. at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
430. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy die right
to a. .. public trial... ."Id.
431. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1992). This section provides
in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to
a... public trial ...... Id. The right is also protected under New York
Judiciary Law § 4 (McKinney 1992). This section provides in pertinent part:
The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every
citizen may freely attend ... except that in... cases for divorce,
seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape,
860 (Vol 11
7
et al.: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
